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SCOPE OF THE CODECISION PROCEDURE 
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UNDER ARTICLE 189b(8) 
OF THE TREATY The Treaty makes specific provision for including the question of  widening the scope of 
the codecision procedure 
1 on the agenda for the 1996 intergovernmental conference. 
Article 189b(8) of  the Treaty reads: "The scope of the procedure under this Article t)'Uly 
be widened, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article N(2) of  the Treaty 
on European  Union, on the basis of a  report to be submitted to the Council by the 
Commission by 1996 at the latest." 
This document· is the Commission's report. 
The procedure referred to Article 189b is referred to as codecision in this paper . 
., INTRODUCTION 
I.  REVIEW OF THE SCOPE OF THE CODECISION PROCEDURE 
1.  The codecision procedure was the product of  extensive discussions at the time of  the 
negotiation of  the Treaty on European Union. It reflects the Member States' wish to 
enhance the democratic nature of the institutions and their operations by conferring 
real co-legislative powers on the European Parliament 
2.  The codecision procedure entails two readings between Parliament and the Council, 
a conciliation procedure in the event of disagreement between the partners and the 
possibility of ultimate rejection by Parliament. The procedure is described in detail 
in Annex I. 
3.  The Council and the Commission attempted an evaluation of  the codecision procedure 
in the reports on the operation of the Treaty on Ewupean Union, presented to the 
Reflection Group in the first quarter of 1995: 
- the Council observed that, although there had been certain difficulties, especially 
in the initial phase, "under this new procedure some 20 legislative acts have been 
adopted within reasonable periods of time, laid down by the Treaty as from the 
second reading." (Report of 10 April 1995); 
- the  Commission  considered  that  "contrary  to  certain  fears  resulting  from  its 
complexity  and  its  length,  the  codecision  procedure  has  worked  well  so far. 
Decisions have been taken fairly quickly as a result of  a good working relationship 
between the institutions This has included an interinstitutional agreement on the 
operation of  the Conciliation Committee, signed on 21  October 1993." (Report of 
10 May  1995). 
4.  In the light of  the experience gained since the above reports were compiled, a number 
of facts update and support the favourable evaluation of the codecision procedure: 
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- 49  instruments have been  adopted under the procedure; 4  7 have  already been 
published in the Official Journal and two are being finalized; 
- of the 20 cases where conciliation was needed after amendment by Parliament, 
agreement  was  reach  in  19  cases.  When  agr-ccmcnt  was  not  reached  in the 
conciliation process, the Council confirmed its initial common position subject to 
inclusion of certain  BIDCDdments  proposed  by Parliament.  The  iDstrument  was 
fiDally rejected by the F.urop2a Parlmment on 21  July 1994;2 
Proposal forB Directive on the 1!pplicatiou of open  network provision (ONP) to ·voice telephony. 
Rejected by Pariiamcnt OA  21  July 1994. 
3 in  one case agreement was reached in the Conciliation Committee but was not 
confirmed by the European Parliament;
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- on average the procedure takes 18 to 24 months. 
Despite  this  generally  favourable  picture  of the  situation,  the  codecision  procedure 
remains undeniably cumbersome and merits simplification. The extension of  the scope of 
the codecision procedure would make such simplification all the more necessary.  In its 
opinion of 27 February, the Commission stated that the codecision procedure "could be 
quicker and more effective if it were simplified, notably by determining time-limits for 
first readings, by dropping the announcement of the intention to reject a proposal at the 
second reading stage, and by dropping third reading". 
One  final  point:  the  combination of the  codecision  procedure  with  unanimity  in  the 
Council will substantially increase the risk of legislative procedures being blocked. 
II.  FRAMEWORK OF THE DEBATE 
1.  The  Presidency  conclusions  adopted  at  the  Turin  European  Council  on 
29 March 1996 noted that "in order to improve the European Union's institutions, and 
also in view of preparing the future enlargement, the Heads of State or Government 
stress the need to look for the best means to  ensure that they function with greater 
efficiency, coherence and  legitimacy. The Conference will  have to examine .  .  . the 
possibility of widening the scope of codecision in truly legislative matters ... " 
2.  The Reflection Group's report noted with respect to codecision that "a large majority 
is in favour of extending it.  Most would extend it to all  legislation adopted by the 
Council  by  qualified  majority.  Another  view  would  focus  attention  on  matters 
currently dealt with by the cooperation procedure, whereas others suggest a case by 
case approach. One member, in principle, opposes any extension." 
3.  In their opinions on the Intergovernmental Conference, the Commission and European 
Parliament also supported extending the scope of codecision: 
"As for the scope of the codecision procedure, the Commission's view is that it 
should apply to the adoption of all acts of a legislative nature. This would entail 
clarification of what actually constitutes a legislative instrument. The codecision 
procedure should in any event be adopted for all decisions currently taken by the 
cooperation  procedure,  which  should  be  abolished."  (Opinion  of 28  February 
1996); 
Parliament  considers  that  "there  should  be  only  one  general  procedure  for 
legislation, namely codecision." {Opinion of 13  March 1996). 
Proposal for a Directive on the legal protection of  biotechnological inventions. Parliament voted against 
the proposal on 1 March  1995. The Commission subsequently presented a new proposal. 
4 4.  Extending the scope of codecision would achieve a twofold objective: 
- it would bring Parliament closer to full legislative capacity ; 
- it would contribute to the general goal of  simplifying the decision-making process. 
especiaBy by doing away with the cooperation procedure. 
s I.  SCOPE OF CODECISION 
I.  FROM THE SINGLE ACT TO THE TREATY ON  EUROPEAN UNION 
The  current  scope  of codecision  (see  Annex  2)  has  emerged  from  a  case-by-case 
approach. This situation was determined by three factors: 
1.  Increasing powers of the European Parliament 
The first stage in this process was brought about by the Single European Act, which 
set up the cooperation procedure: the final  decision remained with the Council, but 
for the first time in the legislative field there was a dialogue - albeit at a distance -
between the European Parliament and the  Council (it had existed in  the budgetary 
field since the 1970s). 
The cooperation procedure was regarded both as the first genuine step forward in the 
European Parliament's legislative powers since the Treaty carne into force and as a 
testing ground -which has yielded positive results - for  subsequent extension of its 
powers. 
Next,  with  the  Treaty  on European  Union,  certain  important  areas  such  as  the 
common  transport  policy,  were  transferred  from  the  ambit  of the  consultation 
procedure to the cooperation procedure, though other equally important areas, such 
as the common agriculture policy, were left under the consultation procedure. 
The assent procedure, hitherto confined to  certain international treaties and  acts of 
accession,  was  extended  to  legislative  areas  such  as  citizenship  or  the  basic 
instruments concerning the Structural and  Cohesion Funds. 
European  Parliament's  participation  in ·the  legislative  process  has  been  steadily 
evolving  and  has  been  extended  to  a  variety  of fields,  but  without  following  a 
consistent pattern. 
2.  Distribution of areas where codecision applies 
This  is  to  some  extent  the  result  of the  transfer  of areas  from  the  cooperation 
procedure to the codecision procedure by the Treaty on European Union. 
Consequently, the main measures relating to the internal market have been adopted 
by  the cod  '~ision procedures whereas,  while  certain  areas  supporting the internal 
market,  such as  framework  research programmes and  guidelines on  networks,  are 
covered by  that procedure, others,  for  example the Structural Funds, the  Cohesion 
Fund and taxation, arc not. 
Similarly, codecision applies to certain policies with a societal impact, for example 
on education, health, consumer protection and culture, whereas others, such as social 
policy, vocational training and the environment, are subject, though sometimes only 
in part, to the consultation or cooperation procedure. 
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·. The distribution of areas under codecision is, therefore, fragmentary and arbitrary. 
3.  Differentiation between different types of instruments in certain areas 
In three areas research, the environment and trans-European networks, the idea was 
to confine codecision to general instruments incorporating the main lines of action. 
This was followed  logically in the case of research:  (the framework programme is 
adopted by the codecision procedure and specific programmes by  the consultation 
procedure).  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of networks,  and  still  more  the 
environment, other procedures are  used,  (in particular the  cooperation procedure), 
which tend to blur the outlines of  the initial plan. With respect to the environment in 
particular, three procedures are applicable: codecision, cooperation and consultation. 
Only general action programmes are codecision matters; the directives which form 
the basis of environment law are cooperation or consultation matters. 
The European Parliament's degree of involvement then varies, but not according to 
any identifiable criteria. 
In short, as matters stand the application of the codecision procedure is founded neither 
on a logical structure nor on precise criteria. 
This  situation has  arisen as  a  result of the  different ways of involving  the  European 
Parliament, the piecemeal allocation of areas to the codecision procedure, and haphazard 
differentiation of types of instrument in certain areas. 
The resulting structure is complex and heterogeneous: the Treaty is something of  a maze 
and the exact role of each institution is far from  obvious.  The situation was bound to 
generate conflicts regarding the legal base and experience has confirmed this. 
II.  SUGGESTED APPROACHES 
During  the  negotiations  for  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  again  during  the 
preparatory work on the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference, four possible ways 
of extending the scope of codecision were considered. 
1  .  Case by case 
This is the approach which has brought about the present unsatisfactory situation. The 
exceptions requested by one or other Member State are added to each other, and the 
outcome is minimal. 
Moreover,  the  case-by-case  approach  is  necessarily  piecemeal:  every  conference 
undertakes to broaden the scope of codecision at the risk of becoming bogged down 
in long discussions leading to clumsy compromises, as there is no generally coherent 
picture. 
Pursuing this approach is likely to render the Treaty yet more illogical and confusing. 
7 2.  General defmition of the "Law" in the Treaty 
During the negotiations on the Treaty on European Union certain Member States, the 
European Parliament and the Commission proposed establishing a hierarchy of  norms 
whereby the "Law", ranking below the Treaty but above national and Community 
implementing  measures,  would  determine  the  fundamental  principles,  general 
guidelines and basic implementing rules of the Treaty. 
This idea was  rejected  partly  on account of the  lack  of familiarity of most legal 
systems with such  an abstract a priori  distinction and partly on  account of legal 
uncertainty  with  respect  to  the  distinction  between  the  "Law"  and  implementing 
measures. 
Nevertheless  the  question of a  hierarchy  of norms  should  be  re-examined  by  the 
Conference.
4  To judge by experience and recent discussions in the Reflection Group, 
it  seems unlikely,  however,  that there will  be  a general clause on the hierarchy of 
norms applicable to  all areas in the Treaty. 
3.  Codecision applied to all instruments currently enacted by the cooperation procedure 
This  technique  was  pioneered  in  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  and  it  should 
certainly be one of the bases defining the new scope of codecision. But it cannot be 
the sole approach, since it would go both too far and not far enough: 
- too far, in that it would cover areas that are not strictly legislative, such as certain 
aspects of Economic and Monetary Union; 
- not  far  enough,  since  it  would  not  cover  such  important  areas  as  citizenship, 
agriculture policy or certain aspects of environment. 
4.  Codecision applied to all instruments adopted by  the Council by qualified majority 
This approach has the merit of simplicity, but it would have the effect of making the 
scope  of codecision  dependent  on  a  procedural  criterion  applied  by  a  single 
institution: the voting method in the Council.  Further, it would again go too far and 
not far enough: 
- too far, since codecision would apply to certain instruments which are definitely 
matters of  implementation, (e.g. certain decisions concerning agriculture policy or 
commercial policy); 
- not far enough, since certain legislative areas would not be covered by codecision, 
if the unanimity rule remained applicable to them. 
There  are  merits  to  each  approach,  but  none,  on  its  own  would  seem  to  provide  a 
satisfactory response to the question of how best to extend the scope of codecision. 
Declaration  16  annexed to the  Treaty  on  European  Union  reads:  "The Conference agrees  that the 
Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in 1996 will examine to what extent it might be possible 
to review the classification of Community acts with a view to establishing an appropriate hierarchy 
between the different categories of act." 
8 D.  PROPOSED APPROACH 
A.  THE PROCESS 
1.  The  extension  of codecision  is  a  natural  step  in  the  process  of enhancing  the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union, a constant of European integration. 
The  Community,  the  most complete  part  of the  Union,  has achieved  a  stage of 
development and maturity which now implies full democratic control. The peoples 
of Europe need to know they are participating in decision-making.' 
The Commission considers that in the present stage of Community affairs proper, 
maintaining the Europeans Parliament's diminished role  is contrary to democratic 
principles.  Its participation in enacting legislation by codecision with the Council 
should become the rule.  This would establish the twofold legitimacy on which the 
Community is founded:  its States and its peoples. 
2.  On purely democratic grounds, codecision should be extended to all the Community's 
legislative activity. But how should that this be defined? 
Giving a legal definition of  a legislative instrument would in practice entail moving 
towards a hierarchy of norms. 
On  the other hand,  the Commission considers that the criteria commonly used  to 
define what constitutes a legislative. instrument could be used as a guideline; it would 
have no legal effect and would not be formalized in the Treaty, but it would make 
it possible to detennine which of the various areas in the Treaty should come under 
codecision and which should not. 
In short,  to meet  these  criteria  legislative  instruments  would  have  to  meet  the 
following description: 
- be directly based on the Treaty; 
- be binding; 
- determine essential. elements of Community action in a given area; and 
- be general in scope. 
3.  There are two considerations which must be borne in mind: 
- the Union's legislative activities are governed by the respect of  the of  subsidiarity, 
whereby, in the areas where it has competence to act, the Union concentrates on 
the most essential activities; 
- it is customary for instruments in all areas of  activity to "delegate" powers to take 
implementing measures, which the codecision procedure is not used for. 
In  this  connection,  the  German  Constitutional  Court  recalled  tbat  the  democratic:  legitimacy 
represented by the European Parliament was an element which made the Treaty compatible with 
German  Basic: Law (judgment given on  12 October 1993). 
9 4.  The Commission feels that applying the criteria listed in paragraph 2 to each of the 
Community's areas of  activities would enable the codecision procedure to be used for 
legislation across the board without the need for a general hierarchy of norms to be 
established in the Treaty. 
5.  This approach would also bring the Union closer to one of the conference's major 
objectives - simplifying decision-making procedures - by abolishing the cooperation 
procedure and thereby reducing the nwnber of  procedures to three. 
B.  TRE RESULT 
1.  This approach would mean using the codecision procedure in the following areas:
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- regulations prohibiting discrimination (currently cooperation procedure); 
- citin:nship (currently assent procedure,  e.g.  right to move and reside  in other 
Member States, or consultation, e.g. right to take part in municipal elections and 
elections to the  European Parliament),  on the contary the possible  new rights; 
(Article 8e) would remain subject to the consultation procedure; 
- aspects of  the internal market not yet covered by the codecision procedure (social 
security  for  migrant  workers,  the  right  of establishment,  services,  capital 
movements, approximation of Member States' regulations); 
- the common transport policy (currently cooperation procedure); 
- harmonization  of legislation  on  indirect  taxes  (currently  consultation  of the 
European Parliament); 
- the minimum rules required to help achieve harmonization in the field of social 
policy (currently cooperation or consultation at the Ew-opean Parliament, except 
agreements  between  the  social  partners,  on  which  Parliament  need  not  be 
consulted); 
- measures  to  help  achieve  general  vocational-training  objectives  (currently 
cooperation procedure); 
- decisions relating to the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund or specific initiatives 
to  promote  economic  and  social  cohesion  (currently  assent,  cooperation  or 
consultation procedure); 
- environmental measures (currently cooperation or consultation procedure); 
- legislation  concerning  development ~  excluding  international 
agreements (currently cooperation procedure); 
- measures  implementing  acts  adopted  by  the  codccision  procedure  (currently 
consultation at the European Parliament); 
- financial measures (currently consultation at European Parliament); and 
- Staff Regulations (  CUI'I'altly consultation at European Parliament). 
2.  The codecision procedure would not be used. however, in the following areas:  7 
6 
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- visa policy, unsuitable by DltUre (currently consultation at European Parliament); 
- industrial  policy  - the  Community  adopts  only  specific  measures  to  support 
Member States' activities (cunently consultatioo at European Parliament); 
A list of  Treaty proyiaions (rd'aCDCeS and COidcnt) is given in AIHlCX  3. 
A list of Treaty provisions is &ivea ill Aaaex 4. 
10 - trans-European networks- technical measures (currently cooperation procedure); 
- implementation of the research framework programme (currently consultation or 
cooperation procedure); 
international agreements, unsuitable by nature (currently three different procedures 
are used:  no  opinion at the European Parliament, consultation and assent); 
- association  arrangements  for  overseas  countries  and  territories  (currently 
consultation at the European Parliament)-closely linked to the Lome Convention, 
for which the assent procedure is used; 
- agreements between  social  partners (currently  no  consultation of the  European 
Parliament and no grounds for amendment by the legislative authority). 
3.  Lastly, the above criteria for  distinguishing between legislative and non-legislative 
areas  cannot  really  be  applied  to  the  common  agricultural  policy,  the  common 
commercial policy or economic and monetary union because of the complexity and 
diversity of the measures adopted in these three areas. 
(a) Common aaricultural and fisheries policies 
At present, consultation at the European Parliament is used for all measures based on 
Article 43  of the Treaty. 
The vast majority of  agricultural measures are strictly administrative in scope and do 
not qualify as  legislation,  so  there  is  no  need to  use  the codecision procedure for 
them. 
It should,  however,  be  used  for  fundamental  acts  of a  general  political  nature 
concerning agricultural policy conception and orientation. The relevant areas, listed 
below, should be referred to specifically in the Treaty: 
- certain aspects of the common market organizations referred to in Article 40(3): 
a specific procedural solution will have to be found with Parliament in instruments 
adopted by the codecision procedure in cases where there is an urgent need for the 
Council to amend an act; 
- application of the  competition rules  to  production of agricultural  products and 
trade in these products; 
- the  setting  up  of one  or  more  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Funds 
provided for by  Article 40(4); 
- common rules on public health, animal and plant health, animal welfare, animal 
feed and seeds; 
- structural policy in agriculture and fisheries; 
- policy on product quality. 
(b) Common commercial policy 
Article 113  as currently drafted does not provide for consultation of the European 
Parliament. 
The common commercial policy is, by nature, essentially concerned with international 
agreements to be negotiated, concluded and implemented with non-member countries 
and international organizations and then administered. These do not entail legislative 
measures, and the codecision procedure is not appropriate. 
11 That procedure should, however, be used for measures of  a typically legislative nature 
such as basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules, rules on defense against barriers 
to commerce and regulations laying down general import and export rules. 
(c) Economic and monetary union 
Measures  relating  to  EMU  are  by  and  large  of the  type  traditionally  seen  as  a 
government prerogative. In most cases, the Treaty accordingly leaves the Council to 
make decisions, sometimes requiring it to consult or inform the European Parliament. 
However, the Treaty stipulates that the cooperation procedure be used for: 
- detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 103(5)); 
- defmitions  for  the  application  of  the  prohibition  on  privileged  access 
(Article I 04a(2)); 
- definitions for the application of the prohibition on purchasing debt instruments 
and granting overdrafts (Article 104b(2)); 
- measures to harmonize the denominations and technical specifications of  all coins 
intended for circulation (Article 10Sa(2)). 
The harmonization measures concerning coins intended for circulation are certainly 
not of a legislative nature. The consultation procedure is therefore most appropriate. 
The  three  other  cases  could  be  seen  as  possessing  certain  characteristics  of 
"legislative" acts.  In particular, they detennine certain major aspects of Community 
activity in the relevant areas or prohibit certain activities. 
However, these characteristics do not seem to have been clearly established, and the 
acts  in question are  part of EMU,  which  is essentially the  reserve of the  national 
govermnents.  · 
In view of this,  the  Commission feels  that, if the  cooperation procedure is to be 
abolished, it is preferable for decisions in these four areas to be taken by the Council 
after CGIISUitation of  the Ewopeiiii Parliament. 
12 The Commission feels that the approach outlined above would enable extension of the 
codecision procedure to be used consistently for all Community legislation. 
The approach is consistent with the Commission's position as set out in its opinion for 
the  intergovernmental conference:  codecision should be  used  for  legislation only,  the 
assent  procedure  for  "constitutional"  areas  and  international  agreements  and  the 
consultation procedure for other areas. 
The cooperation procedure could be  abolished. In most cases it would. be  replaced by 
codecision, though the consultation procedure would be used for some, non-legislative 
instruments currently adopted by the cooperation procedure. 
Finally,  the Commission would point out that extending the scope of the codccision 
procedure is also dependent on simplification. This point should also be examined by the 
Conference. 
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ArticfC I)Oi..  R~  tl'rlmc...t  IWJn'IIWICJ NEW AREAS FOR CODECISION 
Non-discrimination 
Rules aimed at prohibiting discrimination - Article 6(2) 
Citizenship 
Measures to facilitate the right to move and reside freely - Article 8a(2). 
The right at every citizen of the Union to  vote and stand at municipal elections in the 
Member State in which he resides - Article 8b(l  ). 
Common agricultural and f"uheries policies 
The codecision procedure should be  used  for  a variety of acts (to be  specified in the 
Treaty)  with  general  significance  for  the  conception  and  orientation of the  common 
agricultural policy - Article 43: 
- certain aspects of the common market organizations referred to in Article 40(3); 
- application  of the  competition  rules  to  production  of agricultural  products  and 
commerce in these products; 
- the creation of  one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee fund provided for by 
Article  40(4)~ 
- common rules on public health, animal or plant health, animal welfare, animal feed 
and seeds; 
structural policy in agriculture and fisheries; 
- policy on product quality. 
Internal market 
Rules on social security for Community immigrant workers - Article 51. 
Measures on the exercise of publish authority with respect to the right of establishment -
Article 55. 
Principles governing the professions with respect to training and conditions of  access for 
physical persons - Article 57(2). 
Extension of  freedom to provide services to service-providers from non-member countries 
established in the Community Article 59. 
Measures relating to the movement of capital to or from third countries - Article 73c. 
Approximation of laws- Article 100. 
14 Trauport 
Measures to implement a common transport policy - Articles 75 and 84, and in particular: 
common rules  applicable  to  international  transport  to or from  the  territory  of a 
Member State or pmwing across the territory of one or more Member States; 
- the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services within 
a Member State; 
- measures to improve transport safety. 
Tuatiea 
H8lul0l\ization of legislation conceming indirect taxation - Article 99. 
The codecision procedure  should be applicable for measures of a  typically legislative 
nature such as anti-dumping ad anti-subsidy rules, rules on defence against barriers to 
connnerce and regulations Ia  yin& down general import and export rules - Article 113. 
Adoption of  minimum requiraDeacs for gradual harmonint1ion - Article 118a(2), Protocol 
14, A11ide 2(2) aad Protocol 14, Article 2(3) 
1mp1ementina decisioDs relating to the Social Fuod - Article 12.5 
Measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article -
Article 127(4). 
Structural Funds,  Cohesion Fund and specific  initiatives  - Articles  130d(l) and (2), 
130e(l) md 130b 
- definition of  the tasks, priority objectives and the orpnitation of  the Structw'al Funds 
8Dd the Cohesion Fund; 
- general rules applicable to the Funds; 
- .  provisions DeCeSsary Co ensure their effectiveness and the coordiaation of  the Funds 
with ODe another 8Dd with the odler existing fmancial illstrUIDeDts; 
:--a-n.-dec • .  Jatina to ...._ ~·- Jleaigaal "--'-Fund  ~  ~SIOIIS  re  us---~  ~·~  . 
specific initiatives except for the Fuads. 
Lwiaa•••t 
Community .mcsasures to be adopted 1o.dieve tbe objectives set down in Article 130r: 
provilioas pia  •ily of  a fiaAIIIIIhR; 
- me-=  c:onca&iac toWD ..r  C8I&Utly plaaiiilll; 
IS meaaures significantly affeeBns-·.-MmnbeF S~s  choice -betwee&-diifermt energy 
sources and the general structure of its energy supply. 
Measures needed to implement general action programmes setting out priority objectives 
to be attained (Articles 130s(l), (2) and (3) (second subparagraph)). 
Development cooperation 
Measures needed to attain the objeCtives set out in Article 130u, which may take the form 
of multiannual programmes- Article 130w(l). 
Procedures for acts adopted by the codecision procedure 
It would be necessary to adapt Article 145 to enable Parliament and the Council to adopt 
implementing rules for instruments adopted by the codecision procedure. 
Finaacial provisions 
fmancial  regulations  specifying  in  particular  the  procedure  for  establishing  and 
implementing the budget and for presenting and auditing accounts; 
methods and procedure whereby the budget revenue provided is made available to the 
Commission, and the measures to be applied, if need be, to meet cash requirements; 
rules  concerning  the  liability  of financial  controllers,  authorizing  officers  and 
accounting officers and appropriate arrangements for inspection - Article 209. 
Staff Regulations 
This legislative act should be adopted by codecision while observing the requirement to 
consult the other institutions as provided at present - Article 212. 
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AREAS FOR WHICH THE CODECISION PROCEDURE  IS  INAPPROPRIATE 
CitiHeship 
New rights of a constitutional natme, which are, incidentally, subject to ratification by 
national Parliaments (Article 8e) 
All areas not listed in Annex 3. 
This area, by its  very  nature,  is not a suitable candidate  for the codecision procedure 
(Article IOOc(l) and (3)). 
EMU 
Technical areas usually considered as being a government prerogative are not appropriate 
for the codecision procedure (a group of  provisions) 
All areas not listed in Annex 3. 
The codecision procedure is not appropriate for individual measures designed to support 
projects in the Member States (Article 130). 
Tra111-Earopeaa aetworks 
The guidelines adopted in this area cover the objectives, priorities and the main thrust of 
planned  projects,  as well  as projects of common  interest.  They  are  adopted  by the 
codecision procedure. 
The  other measures referred  to  in  Article 129d, currently  adopted  by  the cooperation 
procedure, concern harmonization of  technical standards to ensure the interoperability of 
networks and  financial  support for  Member States.  The  codecision  procedure  is  not 
suitable for technical measures (Article 129d and Article 129c(l)). 
The  framework  programme  is implemented  through  specific  programmes  developed 
within each activity. Thus, the codccision procedure  is used  for measures concerning 
implementation and administration of  tbe framework programme. It should also be borne 
in  mind  that,  since  the  Treaty  on  European  Unitm  came  into  force,  the  specific 
17 programmes have- been adopted by  qualified-ma~·after  -consultation of Parliament 
whereas the cooperation procedure was used previously (Article 1301(3)). 
Three  other  cases  concern  measures  implementing  the  framework  programme.  The 
codecision procedure should not be used for these (Article 130 j  and Articles 130k and 
1301). 
Oveneas countries and territories 
These acts are closely linked to the ACP Convention and, like it, should be adopted by 
the assent procedure (Article 136). 
International agreements 
International agreements cannot be amended by legislation (Article 228). 
Agreemeats between the social partnen 
Agreements between the social partners may be implemented by a Council decision, if 
the two parties so desire, but they cannot be amended, so codecision cannot be used. The 
assent procedure could be used (Protocol 14, Article 4(2)). 
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